The Organization Man (1956)
By William H. Whyte, Jr.

After World War II ended, veterans streamed back into the work force. They found the economy vastly changed. The needs of the war effort had ended the Great Depression, revived the economy, and helped produce giant national corporations such as General Motors, IBM, and Boeing. White-collar workers wanted to avoid the traumas suffered by their parents. It was best, they decided, to go to work for a large corporation and conform to its culture, to blend with the crowd, to share in a group mission. Curious about this phenomenon, William H. Whyte, a Fortune magazine editor, wrote The Organization Man, and it became a best seller. Whyte argued that the old "Protestant ethic" of rugged individualism was dead because the young "organization men" believed in the cult of the group. He warned his readers that the "dehumanized collective" could stifle personal creativity; he urged people to "fight The Organization ... for the demands for his surrender are constant and powerful. The peace of mind offered by organization remains a surrender, and no less so for being offered in benevolence." By 1959, Whyte had made enough money from the book to quit Fortune and become an urban planner.

This book is about the organization man. If the term is vague, it is because I can think of no other way to describe the people I am talking about. They are not the workers, nor are they the white-collar people in the usual, clerk sense of the word. These people only work for The Organization. The ones I am talking about belong to it as well. They are the ones of our middle class who have left home, spiritually as well as physically, to take the vows of organization life, and it is they who are the mind and soul of our great self-perpetuating institutions. Only a few are top managers or ever will be. In a system that makes such hazy terminology as "junior executive" psychologically necessary, they are of the staff as much as the line, and most are destined to live poised in a middle area that still awaits a satisfactory euphemism. But they are the dominant members of our society nonetheless. They have not joined together into a recognizable elite—our country does not stand still long enough for that—but it is from their ranks that are coming most of the first and second echelons of our leadership, and it is their values which will set the American temper.

The corporation man is the most conspicuous example, but he is only one, for the collectivization so visible in the corporation has affected almost every field of work. Blood brother to the business trainee off to join DuPont is the seminary student who will end up in the church hierarchy, the doctor headed for the corporate clinic, the physics Ph.D. in a government laboratory, the intellectual on the foundation-sponsored team project, the engineering graduate in the huge drafting room at Lockheed, the young apprentice in a Wall Street law factory.

They are all, as they so often put it, in the same boat. Listen to them talk to each other over the front lawns of their suburbia and you cannot help but be struck by how well they grasp the common denominators which bind them. Whatever the differences in their organization ties, it is the common problems of collective work that dominate their
attentions, and when the Du Pont man talks to the research chemist or the chemist to the
army man, it is these problems that are uppermost. The word collective most of them
can't bring themselves to use—except to describe foreign countries or organizations they
don't work for—but they are keenly aware of how much more deeply beholden they are
to organization than were their elders. They are wry about it, to be sure; they talk of the
"treadmill," the "rat race," of the inability to control one's direction. But they have no
great sense of plight; between themselves and organization they believe they see an
ultimate harmony and, more than most elders recognize, they are building an ideology
that will vouchsafe this trust.

. . . America has paid much attention to the economic and political consequences
of big organization—the concentration of power in large corporations, for example, the
political power of the civil-service bureaucracies, the possible emergence of a managerial
hierarchy that might dominate the rest of us. These are proper concerns, but no less
important is the principal impact that organization life has had on the individuals within
it. A collision has been taking place indeed, hundreds of thousands of them, and in the
aggregate they have been producing what I believe is a major shift in American ideology.

Officially, we are a people who hold to the Protestant Ethic. Because of the
denominational implications of the term many would deny its relevance to them, but let
them eulogize the American Dream, however, and they virtually define the Protestant
Ethic. Whatever the embroidery, there is almost always the thought that pursuit of
individual salvation through hard work, thrift, and competitive struggle is the heart of the
American achievement.

But the harsh facts of organization life simply do not jibe with these precepts. ... Of all peoples it is we who have led in the public worship of individualism. One hundred
years ago De Tocqueville was noting that though our special genius—and failing—lay in
cooperative action, we talked more than others of personal independence and freedom.
We kept on, and as late as the twenties, when big organization was long since a fact,
affirmed the old faith as if nothing had really changed at all.

Today many still try, and it is the members of the kind of organization most
responsible for the change, the corporation, who try the hardest. It is the corporation man
whose institutional ads protest so much that Americans speak up in town meeting, that
Americans are the best inventors because Americans don't care that other people scoff,
that Americans are the best soldiers because they have so much initiative and native
ingenuity, that the boy selling papers on the street corner is the prototype of our business
society. Collectivism? He abhors it, and when he makes his ritualistic attack on Welfare
Statism, it is in terms of a Protestant Ethic undefiled by change the sacred-ness of
property, the enervating effect of security, the virtues of thrift, of hard work and
independence. Thanks be, he says, that there are some people left—e.g., businessmen—to
defend the American Dream.

He is not being hypocritical, only compulsive. He honestly wants to believe he
follows the tenets he extols, and if he extols them so frequently it is, perhaps, to shut out
a nagging suspicion that he, too, the last defender of the faith, is no longer pure. Only by
using the language of individualism to describe the collective can he stave off the thought
that he himself is in a collective as pervading as any ever dreamed of by the reformers,
the intellectuals, and the Utopian visionaries he so regularly warns against.
The older generation may still convince themselves; the younger generation does not. When a young man says that to make a living these days you must do what somebody else wants you to do, he states it not only as a fact of life that must be accepted but as an inherently good proposition. If the American Dream deprecates this for him, it is the American Dream that is going to have to give, whatever its more elderly guardians may think. People grow restive with a mythology that is too distant from the way things actually are, and as more and more lives have been encompassed by the organization way of life, the pressures for an accompanying ideological shift have been mounting. The pressures of the group, the frustrations of individual creativity, the anonymity of achievement: are these defects to struggle against—or are they virtues in disguise? The organization man seeks a redefinition of his place on earth—a faith that will satisfy him that what he must endure has a deeper meaning than appears on the surface. He needs, in short, something that will do for him what the Protestant Ethic did once. And slowly, almost imperceptibly, a body of thought has been coalescing that does that.

I am going to call it a Social Ethic. With reason it could be called an organization ethic, or a bureaucratic ethic; more than anything else it rationalizes the organization's demands for fealty and gives those who offer it wholeheartedly a sense of dedication in doing so—in extremis, you might say, it converts what would seem in other times a bill of no rights into a restatement of individualism.

But there is a real moral imperative behind it, and whether one inclines to its beliefs or not he must acknowledge that this moral basis, not mere expediency, is the source of its power. Nor is it simply an opiate for those who must work in big organizations. The search for a secular faith that it represents can be found throughout our society—and among those who swear they would never set foot in a corporation or a government bureau. Though it has its greatest applicability to the organization man, its ideological underpinnings have been provided not by the organization man but by intellectuals he knows little of and toward whom, indeed, he tends to be rather suspicious.

Let me now define my terms. By Social Ethic I mean that contemporary body of thought which makes morally legitimate the pressures of society against the individual. Its major propositions are three: a belief in the group as the source of creativity; a belief in "belongingness" as the ultimate need of the individual; and a belief in the application of science to achieve the belongingness.

... I think the gist can be paraphrased thus: Man exists as a unit of society. Of himself, he is isolated, meaningless; only as he collaborates with others does he become worthwhile, for by sublimating himself in the group, he helps produce a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. There should be, then, no conflict between man and society. What we think are conflicts are misunderstandings, breakdowns in communication. By applying the methods of science to human relations we can eliminate these obstacles to consensus and create an equilibrium in which society's needs and the needs of the individual are one and the same.

Essentially, it is a Utopian faith. Superficially, it seems dedicated to the practical problems of organization life, and its proponents often use the word hard (versus soft) to describe their approach. But it is the long-range promise that animates its followers, for it relates techniques to the vision of a finite, achievable harmony. . . .
Like the Utopian communities, it interprets society in a fairly narrow, immediate sense. One can believe man has a social obligation and that the individual must ultimately contribute to the community without believing that group harmony is the test of it. In the Social Ethic I am describing, however, man's obligation is in the here and now; his duty is not so much to the community in a broad sense but to the actual, physical one about him, and the idea that in isolation from it—or active rebellion against it—he might eventually discharge the greater service is little considered. In practice, those who most eagerly subscribe to the Social Ethic worry very little over the long-range problems of society. It is not that they don't care but rather that they tend to assume that the ends of organization and morality coincide, and on such matters as social welfare they give their proxy to the organization.

It is possible that I am attaching too much weight to what, after all, is something of a mythology. Those more sanguine than I have argued that this faith is betrayed by reality in some key respects and that because it cannot long hide from organization man that life is still essentially competitive the faith must fall of its own weight. They also maintain that the Social Ethic is only one trend in a society which is a prolific breeder of counter-trends. The farther the pendulum swings, they believe, the more it must eventually swing back.

I am not persuaded. We are indeed a flexible people, but society is not a clock and to stake so much on counter-trends is to put a rather heavy burden on providence. Let me get ahead of my story a bit with two examples of trend vs. counter-trend. One is the long-term swing to the high-level vocational business-administration courses. Each year for seven years I have collected all the speeches by businessmen, educators, and others on the subject, and invariably each year the gist of them is that this particular pendulum has swung much too far and that there will shortly be a reversal. Similarly sanguine, many academic people have been announcing that they discern the beginnings of a popular swing back to the humanities. Another index is the growth of personality testing. Regularly year after year many social scientists have assured me that this bowdlerization of psychology is a contemporary aberration soon to be laughed out of court. Meanwhile, the organization world grinds on. Each year the number of business-administration majors has increased over the last year—until, in 1954, they together made up the largest single field of undergraduate instruction outside of the field of education itself. Personality testing? Again, each year the number of people subjected to it has grown, and the criticism has served mainly to make organizations more adept in sugar-coating their purpose. No one can say whether these trends will continue to outpace the counter-trends, but neither can we trust that an equilibrium-minded providence will see to it that excesses will cancel each other out. Counter-trends there are. There always have been, and in the sweep of ideas ineffectual many have proved to be.

It is also true that the Social Ethic is something of a mythology, and there is a great difference between mythology and practice. An individualism as stringent, as selfish as that often preached in the name of the Protestant Ethic would never have been tolerated, and in reality our predecessors cooperated with one another far more skillfully than nineteenth-century oratory would suggest. Something of the obverse is true of the Social Ethic; so complete a denial of individual will won't work either, and even the most willing believers in the group harbor some secret misgivings, some latent antagonism toward the pressures they seek to deify.
But the Social Ethic is no less powerful for that, and though it can never produce the peace of mind it seems to offer, it will help shape the nature of the quest in the years to come. The old dogma of individualism betrayed reality too, yet few would argue, I dare say, that it was not an immensely powerful influence in the time of its dominance. So I argue of the Social Ethic; call it mythology, if you will, but it is becoming the dominant one.

Once people liked to think, at least, that they were in control of their destinies, but few of the younger organizational people cherish such notions. Most see themselves as objects more acted upon than acting—and their future, therefore, determined as much by the system as by themselves.

... If America ever destroyed its genius it would be by intensifying the social virtues at the expense of others, by making the individual come to regard himself as a hostage to prevailing opinion, by creating, in sum, a tyranny of the majority.

And this is what the organization man is doing. He is doing it for what he feels are good reasons, but this only makes the tyranny more powerful, not less.

Whatever kind of future suburbia may foreshadow, it will show that at least we have choices to make. The organization man is not in the grip of vast social forces about which it is impossible for him to do anything; the options are there, and with wisdom and foresight he can turn the future away from the dehumanized collective that so haunts our thoughts. He may not. But he can.

He must fight the Organization. Not stupidly, or selfishly, for the defects of individual self-regard are no more to be venerated than the defects of co-operation. But fight he must, for the demands for his surrender are constant and powerful, and the more he has come to like the life of organization the more difficult does he find it to resist these demands, or even to recognize them.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What does Whyte mean when he says that the new "organization men" not only work for large corporations, they "belong" to them? Why was "belongingness" so important to Americans in the post-World War II era?

2. Describe what Whyte meant by the "social ethic."

3. How realistic was Whyte's appeal for people to "fight" the organization and its imperatives?